an in-between move

Cool kids read The Bellman.


Don't read this blog!

I mean, thanks for dropping by my little corner of the blogospheric backwaters, but the blog you should be reading is The Bellman. The stuff I post there is much, much less likely to be imbued with dormitive powers.


[German, from zwischen, intermediate + zug, move

Literally an "in-between move". A move in a tactical sequence is called a zwischenzug* when it does not relate directly to the tactical motif in operation. |source|

image copyright TWIC

From this position, black played a zwischenzug: 19…d5
(Linares 2002, 1-0)


about your blogger

David Rowland studies philosophy at the University of Illinois - Urbana / Champaign, where he's an active member of the Graduate Employees Organization. He used to play a lot of chess, but wasn't all that good. He has a blog. And email.



Friday first six
A query about carrots
Nero himself was a better than country fair fiddle...
Take that, egg man!
Geeks as distributed processing power
Still not philosoblogging
Drunk again, this time with google power


error log

January 2004  
February 2004  
March 2004  
April 2004  
May 2004  
June 2004  
July 2004  
August 2004  
September 2004  
October 2004  
November 2004  
December 2004  
January 2005  
February 2005  
March 2005  
April 2005  
May 2005  
June 2005  
July 2005  
August 2005  
September 2005  
October 2005  
November 2005  
December 2005  


$zwichenzug$ sell-out zone





Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under
a Creative Commons License.

Union Label

Direct Action
Gets the Goods!


some folks I know

Mark Dilley
a daily dose of architecture
Safety Neal
January Girl
mimi jingcha
Hop, Skip, Jump
ambivalent imbroglio
Brooke & Lian


some blogs I read

strip mining for whimsy
It's Matt's World
School of Blog
Fall of the State
Dru Blood
Echidne of the Snakes
Colossal Waste of Bandwidth
Running from the Thought Police
Bionic Octopus


some philosoblogs

Fake Barn Country
Freiheit und Wissen


some labor blogs

Confined Space
Working Life
Dispatches From the Trenches
Labor Blog
Eric Lee


some A-list blogs

This Modern World
Matthew Yglesias
Andrew Sullivan
Political Animal
The Volokh Conspiracy


some other links

Rule 33
This Week in Chess
War Nerd
National Priorities Project
Bible Gateway
Internet Archive
A Weekly Dose of Architecture
Orsinal: Morning Sunshine
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Safety Sign Builder
Get Your War On


some philosoblogging

Six views about reasons
Seidman on reflection and rationality
And another thing
Tiffany's argument for strong internalism
Internalism v. Externalism
What do internalists believe anyway?
Rationalism and internalism
The experimental method in philosophy
Advertising to children
On moral skepticism
A linguistic argument
More on Williams
Williams on reasons
General and particular
Normativity and morality
Political intuitions
What it is, what it was, and what it shall be
Objectivity and morality
Thinking revolution
Abortion and coercion
Moore on torture
On the phenomenology of deliberation
Even more Deliberation Day
more Deliberation Day
Deliberation Day run-down
He made a porch for the throne where he might judge, cont.
He made a porch for the throne where he might judge
Every shepherd is an abomination
Droppin' H-bombs
ad hominem

Saturday, August 27, 2005


An excerpt from Korsgaard

I've posted an excerpt from section 3.5.4 of Christine Korsgaard's Locke Lectures after the jump.

In Kantian moral psychology, the starting point for action is what Kant calls an incentive (Triebfeder). An incentive is a motivationally loaded representation of an object. I am using the term “object” broadly here to include not only substances but also states of affairs and activities. The object may be actually perceived, or conceived as a possible item in the environment, a way that things might be. You are subject to an incentive when you are aware of the features of some object that make the object attractive or appealing to you. Perhaps the object satisfies one of your needs; or perhaps because of the nature of your species or your own particular nature the object is one you are capable of enjoying. It interests you, it arouses the exercise of your faculties, it excites your natural curiosity, or it provides some sort of emotional comfort or satisfaction. It doesn’t matter what – something about you makes you conceive this object as appealing or welcome in a particular way. The object answers to something in you or to the condition you are in. Incentives can also be negative. You may represent an object to yourself as painful or threatening or disgusting, or in some other way unwelcome.

Incentives operate on animals causally but they do not directly cause the animal’s movements. If an incentive directly caused the animal’s movement, it would be something within the animal, not the animal as a whole, that determined the movement, and then as we have seen it would not be a case of action. A desire for food, after all, can cause you to salivate. If it also could cause you to go to the refrigerator, then salivating and going to the refrigerator would equally be actions. If we are to count a movement as an action, the movement must be caused by the animal itself, not by its representations or perceptions. Instead, an incentive works on an animal by making some movement or response seem appropriate to it, by presenting it as a thing to do. According to Kant, incentives work in conjunction with principles, which determine (or perhaps I should say describe) the agent’s responses to those incentives, responses which are guided by the agent’s conception of the world. The principle represents what Aristotle calls the agent’s “contribution” to the action, the thing needed to make it voluntary. Every action must involve both an incentive and a principle: that is, something is presented to the animal’s consciousness, on which it then acts.

In the human case, in the case of a person, it is easy to say what makes action different from mere response, for human beings act on reasons. A person’s principles determine what the person counts as a reason. To the extent that the person determines himself to intentional movement, he takes his desire for food to provide him with a reason for going to the refrigerator; and that is not the same as its directly causing him to go to the refrigerator. We may represent this fact – his own causality or self-determination – by saying that it is his principle to get something to eat when he feels hungry, at least absent some reason why not.

+ - + - + main + - + - +